Short-term incentive schemes for hospital managers by Malambe, Lucas & Bussin, Mark
Original Research
doi:10.4102/sajhrm.v11i1.487http://www.sajhrm.co.za
Short-term incentive schemes for hospital managers
Authors:
Lucas Malambe1
Mark Bussin2
Affiliations:
1Department of Business 
Management, University of 
Johannesburg, South Africa
2Department of Industrial 
Psychology and People 
Management, University of 
Johannesburg, South Africa
Correspondence to:
Mark Bussin
Email:
drbussin@mweb.co.za
Postal address:
PO Box 2334, Saxonwold 
2132, South Africa
Dates:
Received: 27 July 2012
Accepted: 03 June 2013
Published: 21 Oct. 2013
How to cite this article:
Malambe, L., & Bussin, 
M. (2013). Short-term 
incentive schemes for 
hospital managers. SA 
Journal of Human Resource 
Management/SA Tydskrif vir 
Menslikehulpbronbestuur, 
11(1), Art. #487, 9 pages. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/
sajhrm.v11i1.487
Copyright:
© 2013. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS 
OpenJournals. This work
is licensed under the
Creative Commons
Attribution License.
Orientation: Short-term incentives, considered to be an extrinsic motivation, are commonly 
used to motivate performance. This study explored hospital managers’ perceptions of short-
term incentives in maximising performance and retention.
Research purpose: The study explored the experiences, views and perceptions of private 
hospital managers in South Africa regarding the use of short-term incentives to maximise 
performance and retention, as well as the applicability of the findings to public hospitals.
Motivation for the study: Whilst there is an established link between performance reward 
schemes and organisational performance, there is little understanding of the effects of short-
term incentives on the performance and retention of hospital managers within the South 
African context.
Research design, approach, and method: The study used a qualitative research design: 
interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of 19 hospital managers, and a thematic 
content analysis was performed.
Main findings: Short-term incentives may not be the primary motivator for hospital managers, 
but they do play a critical role in sustaining motivation. Participants indicated that these schemes 
could also be applicable to public hospitals.
Practical/managerial implications: Hospital managers are inclined to be more motivated by 
intrinsic than extrinsic factors. However, hospital managers (as middle managers) also seem 
to be motivated by short-term incentives. A combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivators 
should thus be used to maximise performance and retention.
Contribution/value-add: Whilst the study sought to explore hospital managers’ perceptions 
of short-term incentives, it also found that an adequate balance between internal and external 
motivators is key to implementing an effective short-term incentive scheme.
Introduction
The South African government intends to implement a National Health Insurance (NHI) system 
to transform the healthcare funding structure and promote efficiency, equity and access to quality 
healthcare (Department of Health, 2011). One of the critical drivers of success in the proposed 
system is the attraction and retention of high quality hospital managers (Department of Health, 
2011). The proposed NHI system aims to curb the rising costs of providing healthcare (National 
Treasury, 2011). Together with perceived declining revenue, the threat of an NHI is resulting in high 
levels of staff turnover in the healthcare sector (Jones, Havens & Thompson, 2008). It is asserted 
that learning and transferring best practices from the private sector in the area of motivating and 
incentivising managers will aid the attraction and retention of talent in the public sector.
There is a strong, established link between pay for performance and organisational performance 
(Grigoriadis & Bussin, 2007; Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005). This link, however, does not always have 
a positive impact (Bizjaka, Lemmonb & Naveen, 2008; Brick, Palmon & Wald, 2006), especially 
in healthcare, where costs are considered prohibitively high (McIntyre & Thiede, 2007). Short-
term incentives have been successfully implemented for top executives and sales personnel 
across companies in South Africa (Grigoriadis & Bussin, 2007), but there is no published research 
on short-term incentives for hospital managers within the context of South Africa. This study 
sought to assess the perception of private hospital managers regarding the efficacy of short-term 
incentives in their motivation and retention. It also investigated whether such schemes could be 
transferred to the public hospital sector.
There is a growing body of evidence proposing that intrinsic motivators dominate employees’ 
decisions to stay with (or leave) a company (Ederhof, 2011; Hlalethoa, 2010; Kerr-Phillips & 
Thomas, 2009; Terblanche & Boshoff, 2010; Van Schalkwyk, Du Toit, Bothma & Rothmann, 2010). 
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Buetow (2008) suggests that for financial incentives to be a 
powerful motivator, bonuses must reflect both the intrinsic 
values of the hospital manager, such as competence and 
autonomy, and the values of the major stakeholders.
Investigating short-term incentives that can inspire hospital 
managers without compromising healthcare delivery will 
add value to the theory and practice of employee motivation 
in the hospital industry. In the long run, hospital managers 
who are motivated to remain in their jobs for extended periods 
will use their experience and skills to benefit healthcare.
The study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding 
motivation of hospital managers. Lessons learnt from the 
study could be used to stem the loss of experienced managers 
from the public to the private sector. The study will also add 
to the scientific knowledge on the application and use of 
short-term incentives for middle managers.
Retaining the skills of experienced hospital managers is 
critical if the Department of Health is to achieve its new 
business strategy, as espoused in the National Health 
Insurance Policy Paper. Knowing what motivates hospital 
managers to perform better and stay in their positions for 
longer periods can be a useful instrument for healthcare 
policy makers in South Africa.
Literature review
There are numerous theories that have been designed and 
used to explain human motivation. One of the most widely 
known of these is Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs. 
Unlike Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Herzberg’s two-factor 
motivational theory perceives dissatisfaction as playing as 
crucial a role in demotivating employees as satisfaction plays 
in inspiring employees to be more productive (Herzberg, 
Mausner & Snyderman, 1959). Paleologou, Kontodimopoulos, 
Stamouli, Aletras and Dimitris (2006) identify four factors 
referring to intrinsic individual needs and external job-
related aspects. Table 1 demonstrates how these external and 
internal motivators link up with job attributes, remuneration, 
co-workers, and achievement.
The advancement of employee welfare and future needs 
such as pension and insurance are related to Maslow’s need 
for safety. A good incentive plan must balance the four main 
roles that incentive plans serve in organisations, namely 
motivating effort, directing attention, extracting information, 
and attracting and retaining highly effective employees 
(Fisher, Sprinkle & Walker, 2008). Failure to adequately align 
the extrinsic with the intrinsic motivators risks perpetuating 
inequalities (Alshamsan, Majeed, Ashworth, Car & Millett, 
2010), creating a culture in which managers demand 
bonuses simply because they are provided elsewhere (Gross, 
Elhaynay, Friedman & Buetow, 2008), or managers engage in 
opportunistic behaviour to take advantage of the incentive 
system (Mannion, Marini & Street, 2008).
Grigoriadis and Bussin (2007, p. 52) define short-term incentives 
as pay for performance schemes ‘where the measurement 
period is around one year’ and payment is ‘in cash,’ for 
example, ‘profit share, gains share, commission and bonus’.
Table 2 outlines the design elements of short-term incentives 
designed to measure and shape the delivery of healthcare.
For these key design elements to achieve their objectives, 
they must be properly monitored to prevent unintended 
consequences (Ryan, 2010). Table 3 shows seven design 
features that may greatly enhance the design and effectiveness 
of short-term incentives in healthcare.
The response of hospital managers to any or a combination of 
these key design features will be unique to the individual, as 
these will motivate individuals differently.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) urges all member 
countries to move towards achieving universal healthcare 
coverage; that is, a healthcare financing model providing 
financial risk protection and ensuring equity (WHO, 2005). 
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TABLE 1: Four components of individual and external needs.
Factors Label Expression Manifestation
Intrinsic motivators Job attributes Participation in decision-making, creativity and skill 
exploitation 
Individual’s self-needs, generated from internal values that must 
be satisfied before true job satisfaction can be experienced
Extrinsic work-related motivators Remuneration Salary and benefits, pension, insurance and bonus Generated from external values that must be satisfied before true 
job satisfaction can be experienced 
Intrinsic motivators Co-workers Recognition, performance-linked awards and invitations 
to contribute in important meetings 
Professional relationships with supervisors and colleagues as a 
source of satisfaction and potential motivation 
Intrinsic motivators Achievement Pride, appreciation, respect and social acceptance Generated from individual’s internal needs
Source: adapted from Paleologou, V., Kontodimopoulos, N., Stamouli, A., Aletras, A., & Niakas, D. (2006). Developing and testing an instrument for identifying performance incentives in the Greek 
health care sector. BMC Health Services Res, 6, 118–128.
TABLE 2: Key design elements of short-term incentive schemes.
Design element Common factors Diverse factors 
Objectives Quality healthcare Volume, equity, patient satisfaction, patient safety and cost-effectiveness 
Unit of assessment Top and middle managers Individual clinicians, clinical teams or larger organisational aggregates 
Performance measures Driven by choice of objectives Process versus outcomes 
Analysis and interpretation of performance data Link between actual performance and measured 
performance 
Vary widely in the sophistication of the data analyses that underpin them 
Performance standards Performance criteria Benchmarks 
Financial rewards Size Predictability 
Source: adapted from Mehrotra, A., Sorbero, M.E.S., & Damberg, C.L. (2010). Using the lessons of behavioral aeconomics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs. American Journal 
of Managed Care, 16(7), 497–503.
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McIntyre, Goudge, Harris, Nxumalo and Nkosi (2009, p. 726) 
postulate that NHI would be ‘a single pool of funds comprising 
allocations from the general tax revenue and mandatory 
contributions utilised to acquire quality healthcare from 
recognised providers’. Ensuring that all the key ingredients for 
the success of NHI are in place will rest on the motivation of 
public hospital managers and staff (Ataguba & Akazili, 2010; 
McIntyre et al., 2009). Motivation is vital for performance 
management practices in hospital industries that have either 
achieved universal coverage or are moving towards its 
achievement (Dambisya, 2007; Peng, Pike & Roos, 2007).
In the long run, hospital managers who are motivated to 
stay in their jobs for longer and are motivated to perform 
will use their experience and skills to benefit healthcare. A 
review of the literature has revealed that few studies in South 
Africa have examined the effect of short-term incentives on 
middle managers. There is no published research focusing 
on hospital managers and the use of short-term incentives 
to drive their performance and increase their retention. The 
present study therefore sought to explore the perceptions, 
views, feelings and thoughts of private hospital managers 
to understand the impact of short-term incentives on their 
performance and retention.
Method
Research approach
This study was exploratory and followed a qualitative design 
to understand the perceptions of hospital managers regarding 
short-term incentives. The qualitative approach allows the 
researcher to take an ‘insider perspective’ to investigate 
research questions comprehensively, honestly, and in detail 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2010). As part of the interpretive paradigm, 
the qualitative research design involves taking ‘people’s 
subjective experiences seriously as the essence of what is 
real for them (ontology)’ and constructing logic and meaning 
‘by interacting with them and listening carefully to what 
they tell’ researchers (epistemology)’ (Terre Blanche, Kelly & 
Durrheim, 2008, p. 273).
Terre Blanche et al. (2008) conclude that an in-depth 
understanding of the respondents’ insights can be gained 
from integrating, linking and matching their points of view 
to the research questions without losing the context that 
underpins their perspectives. The present researcher believes 
that to discover the truth and knowledge is to understand 
the meaning of the reality that the participants connect to 
motivation and short-term incentives within the milieu of 
being a hospital manager.
Research strategy
The population of the study was private hospital managers. 
The Hospital Association of South Africa (HASA) maintains 
a database of all known private hospitals in Southern Africa; 
this was used as a sampling frame. HASA represents over 
95% of private hospitals in South Africa.
The researcher was employed by the HASA at the time of 
this study, and had easy access to the hospital managers. 
This also gave the researcher the advantage of insight into 
the organisational processes and behaviours in the private 
hospital industry. After the sampling process, consent to 
participate in the study was solicited. This was done through 
a formal letter, followed by a telephone call for confirmation 
and to set up the interview. In some cases, top management of 
the hospitals was engaged to give the managers permission 
to participate in the research.
Sampling
The HASA database, containing 215 private hospitals and 
approximately the same number of hospital managers, 
was used as a sampling frame. Purposive sampling, a type 
of judgemental sampling, provided the researcher with a 
sample that was representative of both the bigger, major 
hospital groups and smaller, independent hospitals. This 
minimised ecological fallacy, defined by Durrheim (2008, p. 41) 
as the type of logical error that occurs ‘when a researcher 
investigates one unit of analysis, and then draws conclusions 
about a different unit of analysis’. Though purposive 
sampling is suitable in qualitative studies (Onwuegbuzie 
& Leech, 2007), there is no widely accepted figure for the 
sample size (Durrheim, 2008). Nonetheless, Onwuegbuzie 
and Collins (2007, p. 289) note that the size of the sample in 
qualitative research should not be so small ‘as to make it 
difficult to achieve data saturation, theoretical saturation, 
or informational redundancy’, or so big as to make it 
complicated ‘to undertake a deep, case-oriented analysis’. 
The present study researched the perceptions of 19 hospital 
managers in Gauteng, North West and Mpumalanga, due to 
proximity to the researcher.
Data collection method
A qualitative strategy using semi-structured interviews was 
deemed most suitable to provide an in-depth description 
of hospital managers’ perceptions and experiences, as it is 
participatory and reduces mistrust between research subjects 
and researchers (cf. Babbie & Mouton, 2010). The researcher 
grouped themes from the responses in order to answer the 
TABLE 3: Seven design features to improve pay-for-performance programmes.
Number Commonly used design Suggested improvement 
1 Incentive given as a lump sum Divide the lump sum into a series of smaller incentive payments 
2 Relative thresholds Use tiered absolute thresholds (e.g., 25%, 50%, 75% and 90%)
3 Long lag time between care and receipt of incentive Shorten lag time to as short as possible 
4 Use of withhold payments Consider bonus payment or use of deposit contracts 
5 Complex, unclear structure of programme (e.g. shared savings programme) Simplify programme so that uncertainty is minimised 
6 Incentive often given as an increase in fee schedule reimbursement Decouple incentive payment so that it is given separately; consider a lottery
7 Monetary incentives Use in-kind incentives
Source: adopted from Mehrotra, A., Sorbero, M.E.S., & Damberg, C.L. (2010). Using the lessons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs. American Journal 
of Managed Care, 16(7), 497–503.
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research questions, namely determining the short-term 
incentives for hospital managers.
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews 
that consisted of flexible and open-ended questions. The 
literature review was used to compile the guiding themes 
and questions for the qualitative study. The interviews were 
conducted from the middle of May 2011 to the end of July 
2011. Taking between 45 and 60 minutes, the interviews 
took place at the research participants’ workplaces. Each 
interview began with a confirmation of the objectives of the 
study. Interviewees were then assured of the confidentiality 
of all data collected.
Recording of data
The researcher requested and was granted permission to 
record the interviews, using an electronic recording device 
to ensure accuracy. The researcher also took notes during 
the interviews.
Data analyses
The unordered raw data were transformed into a data set 
of meaningful themes that could be easily analysed. The 
analysed data formed patterns of similarities and differences 
that were further analysed and interpreted against the major 
constructs and objectives of the study. Johnson and Barach 
(2008, p. 196) note that the aim of this process is to build up a 
comprehensive ‘representation of the words and actions and 
hopefully to capture the thoughts behind them’.
Strategies employed to ensure quality data
The researcher followed the suggestion of Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech (2007) that the collection and analysis of data be 
documented meticulously and cautiously to assure reliability. 
The study provides all the details of the research process, 
including conceptualisation, sampling, data collection 
techniques and data analysis processes, to allow the audience 
to judge the degree to which the research is transferable to 
other settings.
Reporting
The findings are presented in tables in an objective manner. 
To capture the essence of the participants’ perceptions, 
verbatim excerpts from the accounts of the participants are 
quoted. To ensure participant confidentiality, no reference 
is made to individual respondents, their locations or the 
hospitals they manage.
Findings
The nature of a short-term incentive scheme for 
hospital managers
All of the respondents (N = 19; 100%) indicated that short-term 
incentive schemes are used in the private hospital industry to 
motivate hospital managers. All respondents (N = 19; 100%) 
mentioned that a bonus is the most common short-term 
incentive scheme being used to motivate hospital managers. 
The majority of respondents (N = 14; 74%) also mentioned 
that a variable compensation scheme or a combination of a 
bonus and a share scheme is also used in motivating hospital 
managers.
The majority of the respondents (N = 11; 58%) listed a bonus 
as one of the tools used by their own employers to motivate 
hospital managers. Most of these respondents defined the 
bonus as ‘calculated as a percentage of basic salary’. Six of 
the respondents work for a company that uses a combination 
of shares and cash (as a bonus) (N = 6; 32%). However, on 
further probing, these shares appear to be redeemable only 
after a period in excess of one year: ‘Though the shares are 
given to you based on your performance for this financial 
year, you’ll only cash them in in three years time.’ The balance 
of the respondents (N = 2; 10%) declined to be specific, as 
they considered their own incentives a private matter. 
They preferred talking in general terms, and continued to 
participate in the study.
Factors other than short-term incentives that 
motivate hospital managers
From responses received, four motivational factors emerged. 
Table 4 shows that most of the respondents indicated ‘results’ 
or ‘a desire to succeed’ (N = 12; 63%) as what motivates them 
to work harder.
The need to succeed was defined in a variety of ways; for 
instance, ‘the success of the hospital’; ‘bringing the [hospital] 
to the next level’; and ‘leaving [the hospital] a smooth-running 
place as compared to the initial state’.
From the responses received when participants were asked 
about the benefits of short-term incentives, the researcher 
grouped similar comments to formulate themes. Table 5 
demonstrates that respondents perceived short-term incentives 
as a motivational tool to improve clinical governance in 
TABLE 4: What motivates you to perform better?
Emerging theme Frequency %
Improved results or success 12 63
Financial incentives 6 32
Promotion prospects 6 32
Pressure 3 16
TABLE 5: Emerging themes regarding perceived pay-for-performance benefits.
Theme N Quotation
Planning mechanism 6 ‘Provide a platform for setting up goals for the next period.’
Improve clinical governance 10 ‘Well-incentivised managers make doctors happy, and happy doctors will want to stay within my hospital.’
Improve company performance 6 ‘Ensure company goals are met.’
Loyalty 6 ‘Create a sense of attachment to company.’
Recognition 6 ‘Boost self-esteem.’
N, number of respondents.
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hospitals (N = 10; 53%), encourage loyalty (N = 6; 32%), 
improve company performance (N = 6; 32%), improve 
planning (N = 6; 32%) and boost self-esteem (N = 6; 32%).
Regarding the negative consequences of not implementing 
pay-for-performance schemes, four themes emerged, as seen 
in Table 6. Staff turnover (N = 7; 37%), poor performance 
(N = 6; 32%) and the demoralisation of workers (N = 4; 21%) 
were mentioned as the likely consequence of failing to pay a 
bonus to hospital managers for performance.
Drivers of a short-term incentives policy
Financial performance (N = 10; 53%) was mentioned most 
frequently as the major driver of the implementation of 
a policy of providing short-term incentives for hospital 
managers. Respondents also mentioned competition (N = 4; 
21%), talent retention (N = 4; 21%), transformation (N = 4; 
21%) and clinical governance (N = 4; 21%) as strong drivers 
of such a policy. Respondents who perceived competition 
to be the major driver mentioned that ‘what happens in the 
market’ is more important than what happens internally in 
deciding on the use of short-term incentives.
Even so, most of the respondents (N = 8; 42%) were content 
with the way short-term incentives for hospital managers 
are administered. Table 7 shows the gaps in the policy and 
implementation identified by the participants.
The existing gaps point a way to other strategies that the 
industry could use to improve pay-for-performance schemes.
Short-term incentive measures
Respondents mentioned clinical governance and quality of 
healthcare most frequently (N = 13; 68%) as critical measures 
of pay for performance for hospital managers. Financial 
performance (N = 9; 47%) and how a manager manages 
human resources (N = 9; 47%) also emerged as important 
performance indicators for hospital managers. Patient 
satisfaction, number of patients, performance of the group as 
well as management of resident doctors and specialists were 
also mentioned as components of the measurement criteria.
Applicability of private hospital managers’ 
short-term incentives to the public sector
As seen in Table 8, 13 respondents (68%) indicated that 
applying short-term incentives in the public sector will 
motivate hospital managers. Other respondents were either 
not sure (N = 3; 16%) or disagreed (N = 3; 16%) with this 
suggestion.
Respondents who were not in favour of implementing pay-
for-performance schemes in the public sector believe that 
improving the working conditions in the public sector will be 
more motivational to hospital managers than paying a bonus.
Discussion
Outline of the results
The main objective of the study was to explore the perceptions 
of hospital managers regarding short-term incentives. 
The respondents showed an acute awareness of pay-for-
performance schemes being used to motivate hospital 
managers. Even though intrinsic factors are key motivators of 
hospital managers, the absence of extrinsic motivators such as 
a bonus is demoralising, and may lead to poor performance or 
cause hospital managers to leave for greener pastures. These 
findings confirm Herzberg’s theory that dissatisfaction plays 
as crucial a role in demotivating employees as satisfaction 
plays in inspiring them (Herzberg et al., 1959).
TABLE 7: Gaps in the current pay-for-performance by theme.
Existing gaps Responses to the question: What are the gaps in the current pay-for-performance scheme?
Lack of flexibility ‘The structure is too rigid. You can motivate more managers by using other forms of motivation like extra leave days.’ 
‘Remove the rigidity in the implementation of incentives.’ 
‘Now you have to operate within the structure – no flexibility. We lose good people because of this structure.’ 
‘Too much standardisation – the bosses don’t see managers as individuals. You become a number, and I want to be different.’ 
‘How can I perform when our policies must look the same?’
Unfair review measurement criteria ‘I become frustrated when I’m measured on deliverables that are out of my control.’
‘Now a new hospital is being built 5km from mine. It’ll affect me directly, but I’m still expected to perform better than before there 
was any competition.’
Not aware of any ‘Difficult to say, because I’m not at the top and looking at the bigger picture.’
Pay that is not competitive ‘Restructuring the basic salary may improve morale.’
Poor alignment with cash-flow management ‘I’d make the measurement period shorter than a year. From a cash-flow perspective, it should be more meaningful if it’s after 
every six months.’
The whole structure requires reviewing ‘The structure emphasises the performance of the group ... the result is that outstanding performers are rewarded the same as 
non-performers.’ 
‘Differentiate group from hospital performance.’
TABLE 6: Emerging themes of likely consequences of not using short-term incentives.
Theme N Quotation
Poor performance 6 ‘They must have the carrot, or the results will be poor.’
Staff turnover 7 ‘The competition is likely to use that to its advantage.’
No consequences 6 ‘Pay a good basic salary, ensure you pay at the top of the quartile, and there’s no need for incentives.’
Demoralisation 4 ‘A lot of demoralised managers.’
Note: Six respondents (N = 6; 32%) thought that short-term incentives play no part in motivating hospital managers if a company pays a competitive basic salary.
N, number of respondents.
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A bonus, calculated as a percentage of basic salary, emerged 
as the most common short-term incentive used to motivate 
hospital managers. Some hospitals use a combination of 
a bonus and shares. Even though the shares can only be 
redeemed after a period in excess of a year, the fact that these 
are awarded as a result of a manager’s performance in a 
financial year is in line with Grigoriadis and Bussin’s (2007) 
definition of a short-term incentive.
The respondents perceived short-term incentives for hospital 
managers as a tool to improve clinical governance, planning, 
loyalty, performance and managers’ self-esteem. These 
benefits support Buetow’s (2008) belief that motivation 
in healthcare is largely intrinsic and should reflect the 
values of the managers’ need for professional fitness and 
independence. Likewise, the perceptions of the hospital 
managers show that governance structures are successful in 
aligning pay-for-performance incentives with the interests of 
major stakeholders.
As seen in Table 9, improving clinical governance (as a 
benefit to the hospital), the desire to see better results (as a 
motivation for the manager), as well as high staff turnover 
(as the likely consequence of not implementing the schemes), 
were all rated highly by the participants.
These findings suggest that using short-term incentives to 
enhance both individual and organisational performance 
must provide a balance between internal and external 
motivators. Building on Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs 
and Herzberg et al.’s (1959) theory of motivation, Paleologou 
et al. (2006) also note that job satisfaction and performance 
respond to both inherent individual needs and external job-
related factors. Hlalethoa (2010) also confirms that there is 
an inescapable connection between extrinsic and intrinsic 
factors motivating an employee’s decision to perform and 
remain with or leave the organisation.
In a study by Bussin and Huysamen (2004) of remuneration 
policy drivers, the majority of the respondents listed 
boosting company financial performance as the major 
driver of a policy regarding short-term incentives. They also 
mentioned competition from other hospitals, talent retention, 
transformation, clinical governance and quality of healthcare 
as other strong policy drivers. That clinical governance and 
the quality of healthcare are ranked so highly is indicative 
that the drivers are linked to areas of implementation. There 
is no indication that such schemes are used as a control 
tool, as reported by McDonald, Harrison and Checkland 
(2008). Implementing short-term incentives as a response to 
competition and sagging clinical governance corresponds 
with the competency-based performance systems outlined 
by Calhoun et al. (2008).
Most of the respondents were satisfied with the way the short-
term incentives for hospital managers are administered in 
their hospitals, and would not choose to improve any aspects 
thereof. Respondents who perceived gaps in the short-term 
incentive schemes identified areas of improvement that tied 
in with what the managers perceived as the benefits of using 
short-term incentives. These gaps can also be seen as due to 
a desire for the managers to be measured on factors within 
their control. For instance, one respondent expressed the 
frustration that ensues when ‘measured on deliverables that 
are out of my control’. Another bemoaned the impact of a 
competitor building a new hospital nearby: ‘[A new hospital 
in the area] will affect me directly, but I’m still expected to 
perform better than before there was any competition.’
TABLE 8: Extrapolation of results from the private to the public hospital sector.
Respondent’s answer Statements provided in response to the question: Do you think applying these schemes in the public sector can motivate public hospital managers to 
perform better?
 Yes ‘If resources are available.’ 
‘It will minimise the “I don’t care” attitude.’ 
‘It will make somebody work a bit harder.’ 
‘If it is strictly controlled and done like our group.’ 
‘Many managers in the public sector may think “even if I do well, nobody cares”. Incentivising them may change this attitude.’ 
‘Everybody is struggling to keep their staff, and incentives may work to keep the best in the public sector.’ 
‘It must be linked to skills and good performance rating systems to ensure it works.’
No ‘I’ve worked in the public sector, and I don’t see it working without finding out what motivates people serving in the public sector.’ 
‘If you can’t see your progress as a manager in the public sector, you’ll not be motivated, regardless of your bonus.’ 
‘Unless the manager can see progress and a chance for growth, no bonus will motivate him.’
Maybe ‘The way to motivate them is to give them a good basic salary, better working conditions, and growth potential.’ 
‘The public sector has other problems such as issues of control and delegation that goes [sic] beyond the compensation.’
 ‘But there are many other problems that the public hospitals must deal with before establishing incentives for managers. They still need to worry about 
putting the right people in the right jobs.’
TABLE 9: Perceived benefits of short-term incentives for the hospital.
Perceived benefits for the hospital C Motivational factors for the hospital manager Likely consequences of not using schemes N
Improved clinical governance† 12 Better results† Staff turnover† 7
Improved company performance 9 Financial incentives Poor performance 6
Improved loyalty and recognition 9 Promotional prospects No consequences 6
Planning mechanism 5 Pressure Demoralisation 4
C, counts; N, number of respondents.
†, highly ranked.
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Respondents who thought that short-term incentives would 
not work in public sector deliberated that hospital managers 
anywhere would respond more to intrinsic than extrinsic 
motivators. They mentioned that an opportunity to grow in 
the profession should be enough to motivate managers. A 
good basic salary and a bonus would motivate public hospital 
managers just as better working conditions, growth potential 
and hiring the ‘right people in the right jobs’ would. Like 
those in the private sector, public hospital managers must 
be expected to show measurable outcomes and efficiency in 
practising evidence-based healthcare delivery if they are to 
be incentivised for their competencies and efforts.
Practical implications
Based on the findings of the study, the researcher developed 
a framework for short-term incentives in the public hospital 
sector. Figure 1 indicates that key drivers, design factors and 
performance measures must be geared to ensure that health 
conditions, life expectancy, mortality and the general well-
being of society are improved. It is therefore imperative to 
develop a deeper understanding of these factors and learn 
how they may contribute to a public hospital’s ability to 
deliver quality healthcare. The framework also suggests that 
balancing intrinsic and extrinsic motivators must be at the 
centre of a short-term incentive scheme to address all the 
aspects that motivate hospital managers.
The findings show that the majority of the respondents 
believed that improving public hospital performance and 
clinical governance must be the major policy drivers. The 
respondents cited hospital performance and enhancing 
clinical governance as critical factors in improving excellence 
in the public hospital sector. As the centrepiece of the NHI 
is improving the quality of the country’s health system, 
motivated public hospital managers are crucial to its success. 
The respondents also suggested that improving the working 
conditions of the managers in the public and private sectors, 
ensuring career growth prospects and incorporating their 
desire to succeed will enhance both the performance and 
esteem of public hospital managers. In turn, this will have 
a positive impact on the healthcare delivery outcomes of 
public hospitals.
Furthermore, ensuring a competitive basic salary structure 
and an adequate bonus as a percentage of annual salary will 
motivate public hospital managers. As noted by Dambisya 
(2007) and found in the present study, the motivation of 
hospital managers may be the missing link in making 
public hospitals centres of excellence, as envisaged by 
the NHI. The establishment of short-term incentives for 
public hospitals will be successful, respondents believed, if 
performance is adequately linked to measurable outcomes 
and competencies and is closely monitored. For the evidence-
based measurement criteria to be perceived as fair and 
within the control of the manager, the framework must 
incorporate regular monitoring and evaluation. This means 
that the framework must be strictly tied to the performance 
contract targets agreed upon between top officials and the 
hospital manager. The key elements of the framework 
would need to be designed in such a way that they enhance 
health conditions, life expectancy and the general well-
being of society, whilst lowering morbidity and mortality, as 
envisaged by the NHI (Department of Health, 2011).
Limitations of the study
The focus of the study was to explore the use of short-term 
incentive schemes in the private hospital industry. The study’s 
approach was qualitative, and relied on the subjectivity of 
the respondents. There is no conclusive evidence that these 
perceptions of private hospital managers would be the same 
as those of public hospital managers. This study provides an 
insider perspective on the use of short-term incentives in a 
FIGURE 1: Framework for the incentives of public hospital managers.
Improve clinical governance
Improve hospital 
performance
Improved loyalty and 
recognition
Intrinsic Motivators:
• Better working conditions
• Growth potential
• High self-esteem
• Desire to succeed
Drivers for Short-Term incentives
Key Design Factors
Measures
Extrinsic Motivators:
• Bonus as % of salary
• Good basic salary
Criteria:
• Link to deliverables
• Fair and in manager control
• Contact targets
• Evidence-based
Performance:
• Closely monitored
• Link to skills/Stefl’s competencies
• Measurable
Transformation
Planning and better results
Pressure to improve quality 
of care
Original Research
doi:10.4102/sajhrm.v11i1.487http://www.sajhrm.co.za
Page 8 of 9
specific setting, rather than an analysis of the general practice 
of using short-term incentive schemes. Testing the effects of 
short-term incentives using a quantitative technique could 
determine the reputation and attractiveness of these schemes 
across the entire healthcare sector.
Recommendations
Focusing on the private sector hospital manager responses, 
this study infers a value-add to the public sector hospital 
management of incentives. Further studies on the insider 
perspectives of public hospital managers regarding the 
implementation of short-term incentives could be the key in 
motivating managers to improve the quality of healthcare and 
also in retaining scarce skills in public hospitals, especially 
now that policymakers are considering implementing an 
NHI system.
Important areas here will be improving clinical governance, 
the quality of healthcare, as well as relationships with Human 
Resources and other stakeholders, such as patients and 
independent doctors and specialists working at the hospitals. 
It emerged from the study that there are two parallel short-
term incentive systems, namely a bonus and a combination 
of a bonus and share options. A longitudinal study could be 
useful in establishing the efficacy of the different types of 
short-term incentives for hospital managers.
Conclusion
This study was conducted at a time when South Africa was 
reviewing the funding structure of the entire health sector 
and suggesting an NHI system as a strategy to improve access 
to quality healthcare. Short-term incentives and healthcare 
in the country that can inspire managers to perform better 
and stay longer in their jobs will contribute to the success of 
the health system. The research confirmed that providing a 
proper balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators is 
the key to designing a performance management framework 
to keep hospital managers motivated.
The findings can also be used to cultivate strategies and policies 
designed to recruit, motivate and retain hospital managers 
in public hospitals. The study provides a convincing case for 
both the private and the public sector to review its current 
reward and incentive strategy in a way that would prevent 
managers from moving to the private sector. Retaining skills 
in the public sector is critical for the Department of Health to 
achieve its new business strategy, as espoused in the National 
Health Insurance Policy Paper.
The findings of the study suggest that the framework used 
to motivate private hospital managers will also be effective 
in public hospitals. Similarly to executives and sales staff, 
hospital managers (as middle managers) are positively 
motivated by short-term incentive schemes. Bonus payments 
may not be the major motivator of hospital managers, but 
they are key in ensuring that managers stay motivated and in 
their jobs. Hospitals’ boards of directors and top management 
must establish frameworks to guide the process of designing 
and implementing a motivation strategy for hospital 
managers. Pay for performance motivates hospital managers 
to improve company results and stay in their jobs. It also 
makes middle managers feel wanted. Furthermore, reflecting 
on the managers’ need for competence and autonomy, short-
term incentives can be used as a planning tool to ensure 
effective performance management processes.
It is recommended that top managers consider reviewing 
short-term incentive frameworks to better respond to what is 
happening at the hospital (business unit), rather than at the 
organisation or group level, as hospital managers are motivated 
more by areas within their spheres of control. Reviewing the 
implementation of short-term incentives must also take into 
consideration other gaps identified by the respondents, such as 
making the framework more flexible (customised), improving 
basic salary and aligning performance measurement criteria 
to the business unit’s cash flow.
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